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GEORGE A. LEET BUSINESS LAW
SYMPOSIUM
LAWYERS IN THE CROSSHAIRS:
THE NEW LEGAL AND ETHICAL
DUTIES OF CORPORATE ATTORNEYS
INTRODUCTION
George W. Dent, Jr.t
Welcome to the George A. Leet Business Law Symposium. The
symposium was endowed by a generous gift from George A. Leet, a
1946 graduate of our law school, and a dedicated supporter of the
University for many years. Mr. Leet spent almost his entire career
with the National Labor Relations Board, ultimately serving as Senior
Associate Executive Secretary. His abiding interest in business law is
manifested in this symposium series, which is held in alternate years.
The George A. Leet Business Law Symposium adds luster to our
school by bringing national leaders in law, business, government, and
academia to discuss challenging and critical issues in the field.
George Leet passed away last year but his legacy lives on in this
symposium. I think he would be proud of how that legacy is being
served today with a colloquy on the most important and controversial
issue in business law right now. The corporate scandals at Enron,
Tyco, WorldCom, etcetera, a few years ago, prompted agonized questions about what went wrong and how such catastrophes could be
avoided in the future.' One of the most poignant questions was, where
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were the lawyers? Each of these fiascos seems to have involved serious violations of the law. Already they have led to several criminal
convictions of corporate officers. But in none of those cases did the
lawyers step in to avert a disaster. Perhaps it is unfair to indict business lawyers, generally, over these incidents. Lawyers, generally, do
not know about illegal client conduct. Clients usually hide their misdeeds, especially from lawyers. And even if a lawyer knows of or
suspects illegality, it may be unnecessary or inappropriate for the
lawyer to divulge that information to the outside world. And even if
the lawyers in these cases did not perform as we would wish, it does
not necessarily follow that we should radically alter time-honored
principles of professional responsibility.
It is not surprising though, that public outcry has triggered efforts
that are still under way to transform the role of corporate lawyers.
Congress adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,2 including Section 307,
which imposes new requirements on the lawyers who learn of illegal
acts within a corporate client. The act also includes Section 602, 3
which provides statutory support for SEC Rule 102(e), under which
the Commission can discipline lawyers who violate or aid and abet a
violation of the federal securities laws.4 Although the text of Rule
102(e) has not changed radically in many years, SEC enforcement
actions under the rule have mushroomed. There is also concern that,
without changing the language of the rule, the SEC has altered its
enforcement program, and now under Rule 102(e) it pursues attorneys
allegedly guilty of nothing worse than negligence. Private damage
actions against lawyers also seem to have increased.
There is a proposal to revise the federal sentencing guidelines to
make waiver of these privileges a factor in mitigating the penalty for
a criminal conviction. The Justice Department and the SEC now seem
to consider waiver of these privileges a factor in deciding whether to
prosecute or bring an enforcement action against a corporation. At the
same time, there is a proposal to amend rule 502 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence to provide that voluntary disclosure to a government
agency during an investigation does not waive the attorney-client
privilege or work product, generally.
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Ostensibly, this amendment would strengthen the privileges by
changing the traditional rule that a waiver to anyone is a waiver to the
whole world. However, many practitioners see this proposal as a further step in the evolution of a culture of waiver, in which the waiver
of the privileges, which was traditionally made only in exceptional
circumstances, would become routine.
Behind all these specific issues is the ultimate question: to whom
does the corporate lawyer owe allegiance? Is it the client, the entity,
the corporation, or is it something broader and more abstract like the
public interest? It is sometimes argued that the public corporation,
because it is public, should not be treated the same as an individual or
private business. In many ways, this principle has gained general acceptance. We now expect public companies to disclose all their material information, a practice unthinkable seventy-five years ago. We
now hear arguments that lawyers should be viewed as independent
gatekeepers, not as hired guns or, more politely, confidential advisors.
Is that where we are or should be headed? Part of this broader question is the issue of who defines the interests of the corporate client? If,
as is happening more often, an insurgent shareholder or group elects a
minority of directors who request information from the company's
lawyer, must the lawyer obey? So, I think George Leet should be
pleased that this symposium has attempted to tackle such an important and timely topic.

